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NOTE
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY V. SULLIVAN:
"META-ANALYSIS" AS A TOOL TO
NAVIGATE THROUGH THE SUPREME
COURT'S "STATE ACTION" MAZE
Gregory D. Malaska, Esq.*
Looking For The Next Best Thing

Warren Zevon 1
INTRODUCTION

The Fourteenth Amendment' of the United States Constitution
protects individuals from public discrimination and infringement upon
their right to procedural due process.3 Congress utilized its enforcement
authority under this Amendment 4 to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(42 U.S.C. § 1983),' which permits private redress for alleged civil rights
* Associate, Hanna, Young, Upright & Catina, LLP. J.D. Columbus School
of Law, The Catholic University of America, 2000. The author would like to
thank Professor Ronald Krotoszynski for his assistance with this Note.
1. WARREN ZEVON, Looking for the Next Best Thing, on A QUIET NORMAL
LIFE: THE BEST OF WARREN ZEVON (Asylum Records 1986).
2. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See id. If the public action is taken by a federal actor, similar protection is
provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
5. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
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violations against those parties acting "under color of state law.",6 These
five words have spawned a great deal of discussion and conflict since the
Act's inception, yet federal courts have been unable to interpret the
phrase with any consistency.
The "state action" doctrine essentially limits the scope of actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to those carried out against the elusivelydefined "state actor."7 Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that it might be an impossible task to formulate a succinct formula to
define a state actor, 8 the Court addresses this problem by employing four
separate tests to determine state action: the symbiotic relationship test, 9
the public function test,"' the close nexus test," and the joint
participationtest. 2 Federal courts apply these tests in a somewhat
random fashion, combining bits and pieces of each test for each case." In

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered a statute of the District of Columbia.
17 Stat. 13 (1871), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
6. See id.
7. For an overview of some of the writings regarding the conflicting
interpretations of the state action doctrine, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back
to the Briarpatch:An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State
Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995); Dilan A. Esper, Some
Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663 (1995); Daphne
Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization,45 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1169 (1995); Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the
Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587 (1991); David M. Lawrence,

Private Exercise of Government Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647 (1986); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (1985). For
information regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see generally, MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &
JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997).
8. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting
Kotch v. Pilot Comm., 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
9. Id. at 721-26. The term "symbiosis" was not used in Burton. Instead, it
was coined by Justice Rehnquist to explain the Burton relationship in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
10. Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946).
11. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
12. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
13. Strickland, supra note 7, at 597, n.42.
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addition, the doctrine has been interpreted both broadly 1 and narrowly, 5
based in part on the evolving makeup of the court," thus providing a
confusing backdrop for future interpretation and predictability in due
process decision-making.
Several legal scholars have strongly criticized the lack of consensus on
the proper "state action" test." Some scholars advocate the use of a
meta-analysis test to better incorporate the individual values of the four
tests currently used by the Court." In one of the Court's more recent
decisions •involving
§ 1983, American ManufacturersMutual Insurance Co.
19
v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court failed to utilize this unique approach,
instead producing a decision that continues to examine the state action
trees at the expense of the forest.20
The primary goal of this Note is to outline the Court's journey through
the state action maze and to review each of the separate approaches taken
by the Court, all in an attempt to highlight the value of the meta-analysis
approach. As stated so succinctly in the lyric beginning this Note, there
may not be a perfect test for state action determinations under § 1983, but
the incorporation of the meta-analytical approach is the next best option.
Part I begins with an introduction to the state action doctrine.
Emphasis is placed on the doctrine's historical origins and development
throughout the twentieth century by looking at various cases involving
discrimination and deprivation of procedural due process." The first part
also delineates the separate, fragmented approaches developed by the
14. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982); Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Tulsa
Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42 (1988); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
15. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 345; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); San Francisco Arts &
Athletics v. U.S.O.C., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
16. Esper, supra note 7, at 664-65.
17. See generally, note 7.
18. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 304.
19. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
20. Professor Krotoszynski recognizes this problem and also advocates the
use of a "contextual approach." See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 305.
21. Although Sullivan involves a deprivation of procedural due process, it is
important to note that much of the State Action doctrine's development has
focused on cases involving public discrimination.
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Supreme Court in its state action jurisprudence and provides an
introduction to the "meta-analysis" approach."
Part II establishes the fundamental workings of the workers'
compensation system, with special emphasis placed on the evolution of
the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act 3 (the Act). This part also
outlines some of the current debate on the costs of workers'
compensation and the potential importance of utilization review
procedures. Part II focuses on the major changes in the Act that occurred
in the mid-1990s, which implemented the utilization review program.
Next, Part II supplies a brief survey of lower court decisions addressing
problems with § 1983 actions involving workers' compensation and other
similar health care review systems. Part II concludes with a discussion of
the split between the Third and Fifth Circuits which led to the Court's
decision in Sullivan.
Part III provides the factual layout of Sullivan and reviews the findings
of the District Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. A thorough
examination of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, along with the
concurrences of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, as well as the brief
dissent by Justice Stevens, 4 provides a more comprehensive discussion of
the case. Part IV includes a test-by-test analysis for each of the state
action approaches used by the Court and a demonstration of the use of
the meta-analysis as applied to the Sullivan decision. Part V concludes
the piece by advocating a reevaluation of the role and function of the state
action doctrine in light of Sullivan, while providing some predictions for
future § 1983 actions.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

A private remedy is available to any citizen of the United States under
42 U.S.C. section 1983 whenever an individual's civil rights have been
violated by a party acting under color of state law. This is what is
commonly referred to as the State Action doctrine. § 1983, however, does
not allow a remedy against similar constitutional claims made against

22. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 330.
23. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 77, §§ 1 (West 1992 and Supp. 1998).
24. The Rehnquist opinion is split between a state action inquiry and a
discussion of the protected property interests. Although the property interest
issue is important and will be dealt with in some detail as part of the discussion of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Sullivan, the primary focus of this Note is state
action.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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26
strictly private actors, in essence, protecting a private individual or
business from actions that would be illegal if performed by a public
27
official, agency, board, commission, or department.
Cases,28
The State Action doctrine first appeared in The Civil Rights
where the United States Supreme Court faced numerous complaints
involving racially discriminatory practices by several private parties.29 In
an opinion by Justice Bradley, the Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 30 as preventing private rights of action "until some state law has
been passed, or some state action through its officers or agents has been
taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the
fourteenth amendment."31
Some sixty-five years later, Chief Justice Vinson clarified the state
action concept in Shelley v. Kraemer,32 where the Court concluded that a
private, racially-restrictive land covenant, by itself, was not a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.33 However, once a state court enforced the
covenant, state action attached and established a violation.34 The Shelley
Court reinforced the holding of The Civil Rights Cases by ruling that
"[t]he [Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."35 Thus, in order for a
plaintiff to establish state action under present § 1983 caselaw, two
requirements must be met: 1) the violation or deprivation must be caused
by a right, privilege, or policy created by the state or by someone for
whom the state is37 responsible; 36 and 2) the violator "must fairly be said to

be a state actor.,

Both the Civil Rights Cases and Shelley lay the foundation for a series
of cases in which four "distinct" state action tests have emerged. These
tests create a doctrinal headache for many judges and legal scholars.38
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
entitled
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Lawrence, supra note 7, at 647-48.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Id. at 4.
Id. The case references the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1, 1875,
'An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights.' 18. St. 335. Id.
Id. at 13.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 13.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
Id.
Some commentators have referred to state action as a "doctrinal briar
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Each of the four tests will be discussed below in order of its respective
development and then they will be contrasted with the meta-analysis
approach.
A.

The Public Function Test

The first state action model arose when the Supreme Court decided
Marsh v. Alabama, 9 just two years before Shelley.

In Marsh, police

arrested a Jehovah's Witness for distributing religious literature in
Chickasaw, Alabama, a company town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation. 40 The town functioned much like a normal municipality, yet
corporate officers, rather than municipal officers, adopted a law
prohibiting solicitation without a permit. 4' The plaintiff brought an action
against the company town claiming a violation of her First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, arguing that the private corporation functioned under
color of state law. 42 In an opinion that found state action present, Justice
Black explained, "since these facilities are built and operated primarily to
benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function,
it is subject to state regulation., 43 Thus, under the public function test as
defined in Marsh, if a private entity assumes the role of the state by
engaging in what is traditionally an exclusive public function and proceeds
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of any person, 4that
entity
4
1983.
§
under
liable
be
can
and
actor
state
a
of
assumes the role
Probably the best example of the Court's public function analysis came
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,41 where a public utility provider
terminated the plaintiff's electricity service for failure to maintain her
monthly payments. The plaintiff subsequently filed a claim under §
1983,46 alleging a violation of procedural due process, claiming that the
public utility company functioned as a state actor when it deprived her of

patch," Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 302, whereas others have labeled it "one of
the most troublesome issues in constitutional law." Strickland, supra note 7, at
588.
39. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
40. Id. at 503-04.
41. Id. Permits were required for all materials, yet the company town would
not grant a permit to the Petitioner for the distribution of religious materials.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 506.
44. J. NOWAK, R.

ROTUNDA

1991).
45. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).

46. Id. at 347.

& J. YOUNG,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

457 (3d ed.
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her utility service without a hearing.4" The Court disagreed, first
recognizing that Pennsylvania law did not consider the furnishing of
public utility service as either a state or municipal function. 48 Second, the
Court found that providing goods and services "affected with a public
interest" did not convert the private utility company into a state actor.49
In spite of these holdings, the public function test has not found many
Furthermore, many modern
arrangements to constitute state action.'
cases have narrowed its scope and the frequency with which it is used."
Recent cases have narrowly construed its appreciation, excluding from §
1983 suits cases brought against public defenders,52 amateur sports
children,55 private
corporations, nursing homes,54 schools for maladjusted
16
parties selling goods subject to statutory lien, and intercollegiate sports
organizations. 7
Although the 1980s saw a general narrowing of the scope of the public
58
function doctrine, two cases decided in the early 1990s provided further

47. Id. at 347-48.
48. Id. at 353.
49. Id. at 354.
50. A few early cases found state action in certain private activities that were
considered traditional public functions. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966),
the Court found state action in the operation of a local park (which was donated
by a private individual) in a racially discriminatory manner, ruling: "when private
individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State
and subject to its constitutional limitations." Id. at 299. See also Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (covering primary elections).
51. See supra note 50.

52. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
53. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S.O.C., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987).
54. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982).
55. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
56. See Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-61 (1978).
57. See N.C.A.A. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
58. Not all cases saw the Court failing to find state action under a traditional
public function approach. In West, the Court ruled that a physician who provided
services for a state prison was a state actor when it held:
[I]t is the physician's function within the state system, not the precise
terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly
be attributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the state payroll or
is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship among
the State, the physician, and the prisoner.
487 U.S. at 55-56.

626
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uncertainty for the future use of the doctrine.

9

In Edmonson v. Leesville

Concrete Co., Inc.,6° the Court ruled that a private party's racially-

motivated use of peremptory challenges during a civil trial violated §
1983. The Court elevated the defendant to state actor status because it
believed that the objective of the peremptory challenge was to determine
the makeup ofS a61 government body, the jury, which performs a traditional66
public function. Shortly afterward, the Court, in Georgia v. McCollum, 2
extended similar state actor status to private litigants who used race-based
peremptory challenges in criminal trials. McCollum specifically relied on
Edmondson in extending § 1983 to criminal trials, 63 stating that the
conclusions of Edmondson "apply with even greater force in the criminal
context because the selection of a jury in a criminal case
fulfills a unique
64
and constitutionally compelled governmental function."
Although these two cases appeared to liberalize the strict interpretation
of the public function doctrine used by the Rehnquist Court,65 they are too
closely linked factually and legally in that they focus only on peremptory
challenges used to empanel juries to be a valid predictor of future
decisions. The traditional public function test is becoming increasingly
concerned with the exclusivity of the function and less focused on
tradition. 66
B.

Symbiotic Relationship Test

The "symbiotic relationship" test describes a unique relationship
between the state and private actors, such that the private actor becomes
a mutual partner with the state. The test first appeared in Burton v.
Wilmington ParkingAuthority,67 where the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action
against a restaurant that leased a portion of the Authority's parking lot
when it refused service to an African-American man because of his race. 61
59. See

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,

State Action and the "Under Color of

Law" Requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1983, 553 PLI/Lit 567, 611 (1996).

60. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).

61. Id. at 626.
62. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. See generally, Strickland, supra note 7.

66. Notes taken from edited copy of a previous draft of this Note made by
Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, Spring 2000. See also Krotoszynski, supra note 7,
at 304, n.12.
67. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

68. Id. at 720.
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The Court found state action existed because of the unique and mutually69
beneficial relationship between the parking authority and the restaurant.
The relationship arose because of a long-term lease and because the
Authority provided heat, gas, and structural repairs to the exterior
surfaces on the premises. 7 The relationship between the Authority and
the restaurant was so interdependent that the Court saw a joint enterprise
71
and, thus, state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
The Burton Court recognized that developing a concrete state action
test was impossible. Therefore, Burton stated that courts must emphasize
the importance of making such determinations on a case-by-case basis.72
In fact, the Court specifically limited the scope of its ruling to the facts of
Burton,73 making it the Court's most expansive reading of the state action
• 74
doctrine. This interpretation has been widely criticized since its creation.
In two decisions released on the same day in 1982, the Court rejected
the application of the symbiosis analysis in Blum v. Yaretsky 75 and
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn." In Blum, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the issue
of whether a state may be held responsible for the alleged procedural due
process violations of a nursing home that participated in Medicaid. In
rejecting Burton, the Blum Court held that even extensive state regulation
78
and funding did not make the nursing home a state actor. In RendellBaker, the Court continued its attack on the Burton rationale finding the
fiscal relationship between the state and a school for maladjusted high
school students similar to the relationship between a state and a general
contractor of services, neither of which rose to the symbiotic level of
Burton.79 Although the Court has never expressly overruled Burton, the
69. Id. at 724.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 725.
72. Id. at 722.
73. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725-26.
74. The Supreme Court limited the ruling of Burton to the specific facts of the
case in Moose Lodge, where the Court coined the term symbiotic relationship. 407
U.S. at 175. The Supreme Court referenced Burton in Jackson, yet failed to
expand the scope of the symbiotic relationship test to the relationship between a
private utility provider and the state. 419 U.S. at 358. Although the case has never
been overruled, Burton has been very narrowly interpreted since. See SCHWARTZ
& KIRKLIN, supra note 7, at 526.
75. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
76. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
77. Blum, 457 U.S. at 993-95.
78. Id. at 1011.
79. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842-43.
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modern Court's weak attraction to the symbiotic relationship analysis, as
evidenced in its decisions in Blum and Rendell-Baker, places its future
usefulness in question.
C.

Close Nexus Test

A close analogy to the symbiotic relationship model is the close nexus
test. This analytical model, in comparison to the symbiotic relationship
test, seeks to focus on the degree of interrelationship between the state
and the private actor.
A good example of the symbiotic relationship analysis is seen in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.8° In that case, plaintiff Catherine
Jackson had her electricity service terminated by a privately-owned and
operated utility company after becoming delinquent in her payments."
Jackson filed suit under § 1983, alleging that the utility company violated
her procedural due process rights and assumed the role of a state actor
primarily because of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's extensive
regulation of the entity. 8' Justice Rehnquist's opinion recognized that
even if a private entity is extensively regulated by the state, the proper
inquiry must be "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." 83 The
opinion continued by stating that a private party's exercise of a choice
provided by state law does not automatically transform the private party
into a state actor under § 1983.4
In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,8' the Court established the general
test for state action under the "close nexus" model. In Flagg Bros., a
landlord evicted a married couple from their apartment and stored their
belongings at the Flagg Brothers warehouse." Pursuant to a New York
statute, the plaintiffs were required to pay for the storage and the stored
property was subject to a warehouseman's lien if payment was not

80. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
81. Id. at 347.

82. Id. at 347-48. The Plaintiff claimed that the state regulatory scheme
effectively granted the utility company monopoly status. In addition, the state's

extensive and continuing regulation of the provider transformed the action of the
private utility company into the action of the state. Id. at 351-52.
83. Id. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 176 (1972)).

84. Id. at 357.
85. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
86. Id. at 153.
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received. 87 A dispute arose between Flagg Brothers and the evicted
plaintiffs.
The dispute culminated in a letter by Flagg Brothers
demanding payment within ten days and threatening sale of the property
at auction if the deadline was not met. 8 The Brooks brought suit under §
1983 seeking an injunction against the sale, claiming that Flagg Brothers'
proposed sale violated their procedural due process rights and that the
storage company's actions were attributable to the state.8 9
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, ruled that a
claimant must prove that: 1) a private party acted under "color of state
law;" and 2) the private party's actions were properly attributable to the
state.90 The majority failed to find a sufficient link between the
warehouseman's lien provision in the challenged state statute and the92
9
private repossession absent a hearing ' to establish a nexus relationship.
The opinion reaffirmed the Court's reluctance to define the degree of
interrelationship necessary to establish state action, merely stating that
the Court "has never held that a State's mere acquiescence
in a private
93
action converts that action into that of the state.,
Flagg Bros. is a good example of how the nexus test can be narrowly
construed. Subsequent cases with similarly close relationships between
public and private actors have also failed to establish the required nexus
between the two sectors necessary to a finding of state action. 94 The close
nexus test is very similar to the symbiotic relationship test, yet to this date,
the Supreme Court has rarely found state action solely based on the close
nexus test alone.
87. Id. at 152-53 n.1 (describing § 7-210 of New York's Uniform Commercial
Code).
88. 436 U.S. at 153.
89. Id. at 153-54.
90. Id. at 156.
91. Id. at 153.
92. Id. at 166.
93. Id. at 163-64.
94. In Blum, the Court found no state action when a private nursing home
participating in the Medicaid program terminated the benefits of one of its
patients without a hearing. The Court, citing Jackson, ruled that
the purpose of this [nexus] requirement is to assure that constitutional
standards are invoked only when it can be said that the state is
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The
importance of this assurance is evident when, as in this case, the
complaining party seeks to hold the State liable for the actions of private
parties.
457 U.S. at 1004.
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The Supreme Court has applied the three prior tests in a somewhat
random fashion, rarely finding state action under any of the approaches.
These tests appear more rigid because they set a very high threshold for
finding state action. The public function test seems to have evolved from
some list of activities traditionally exclusive to the state that,
unfortunately, has not been clearly defined.95 Symbiotic relationship acts
like a label that just happened to fit the peculiar facts in Burton.%
Moreover, the close nexus test envisions some unrealistic, organic
relationship between the state and the private sector that always seems
out of reach. The most realistic of the four tests is the one which has most
regularly found state action in private conduct, the joint participation test.
D.

Joint ParticipationTest

Although the previous three tests focus on the interrelatedness of the
private and state actor, the joint participation test concentrates on the
interaction between the two. In part, this test is successful because it does
not require the requisite degree of "sameness" between public and private
actors, nor does it apply a label to the public/private relationship in order
to find state action.
The joint participation test addresses those
relationships where the state encourages, coerces or maintains a joint
partnership with a private party, such that the private actor is cloaked
with the authority of the state.i
The Supreme Court developed the joint participation approach in
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.98 In Adickes, a plaintiff was refused service in
a restaurant "because she was a 'Caucasian in the company of Negroes'
and was subsequently arrested under Mississippi's trespass statute. 99 In
her § 1983 action, the plaintiff argued that a conspiracy existed between
the restaurant owner and the local police officer whereby the police

95. Professor Krotoszynski has also raised concern about what actions are
included in the "exclusive state function group." See Krotosznksi, supra note 7, at
319.
96. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 345 n.227 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,and
California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 88 (1967)). Krotoszynski also
recognized the potential damage that can be done by courts that make state action
determinations based on certain buzzwords rather than thorough explanation. See
Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 305.
97. See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 7, at 550-60.
98. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
99. Id. at 147-48.
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enforced the local custom of segregation.
After applying the joint
participation test, the Supreme Court ruled that the actions of the police
and the restaurant owner constituted state action, and thus, a violation of
§ 1983."' The Court concluded that acting under color of state law did not
require a party to be an officer of the state, but that willful participation in
a joint activity with the state or its agents would establish state action.' °
The joint participation found in Adickes has expanded to address nonconspiratorial public/private interaction in several later cases.0 3 In Lugar
v. Edmonson Oil Co.,' °4 the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a
Virginia prejudgment attachment statute.
Specifically, the statute
required that a petitioner allege that the debtor might dispose of the
disputed property to defeat his creditors in order to gain a writ of
attachment carried out by the local sheriff.
After resorting to the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,'06 the Court broadened
the scope of the joint participation test, finding that: "while private misuse
of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the
State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the
product of state action. 10 7 The Court stated, "[W]e have consistently held
that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure
of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state
actor' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."' ...
The Lugar decision focused on the fact that the sheriff, a public official,
had taken part in the private collection as the basis for its finding a state
action. In so finding, the Court stated, "Whatever may be true in other
100. Id. at 148.
101. Id. at 152.
102. Id. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966), the Court also
acknowledged that the requirements for "state action" were the same as for
actions "under color of state law." Id. at 794 n.7.
103. In contradiction, the Court in Jackson failed to find state action despite
the strong interrelationship and regulation between the state and the public utility
provider. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Similarly, in Blum, the Court strictly construed the
joint participation test, ruling that: "our precedents indicate that a State normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." 457 U.S. at 1004 (citing
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978)).
104. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
105. Id. at 924-25.
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id. at 941.
108. Id.
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contexts, this is sufficient when the State has created a system whereby
state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one party
to a private dispute."' 9 The joint participation test is the easiest to apply
because it focuses on what the state and private actor do, not on how they
are related to each other. Unfortunately, its practicality and simplicity
have not affected the confusion surrounding application of the other three
tests.
E.

The Meta-Analysis Approach

The previous sections highlighted some of the approaches used by the
Court in making state action determinations under § 1983, yet no hard
and fast test exists to determine whether state action has occurred.10
Most decisions discussed above incorporated several approaches and
blended some of the ingredients of each separate analysis, leading to a
high degree of confusion and unpredictability. The lack of boundaries
and synergy between the four tests shows the need for a new approach,
one that sees the "forest" rather than the "trees."
In response to frustrations surrounding the use and function of the four
previous tests, Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr. has proposed a unique,
commonsense approach to the confusing state action problem"'
Krotoszynski's analysis attempts to liken constitutional analysis to
scientific analysis, recognizing that while the existing state action tests
should not be completely discarded, they should also not be mechanically
applied."' The meta-analysis approach should be applied taking into
account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether state
action exists."'
This approach recognizes that in science, a study must have a ninetyfive percent confidence rating before it can be accepted as valid.1 4 Under

109. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. Subsequent cases have also established that if a
private party makes use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of
state officials, they can be deemed state actors for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc.v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988)
(involving an Oklahoma nonclaim statute).
110. Krotoszynski similarly recognizes that there are no clear and concrete
state action tests available. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 318 n.77.
111. See generally, Krotoszynski, supra note 7.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id. Krotoszynski states that "'meta-analysis' involves grouping data from
separate scientific studies to reach the 95% confidence interval required to
substantiate scientific claims." Id. at n.15.
114. Id. at 337.
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scientific meta-analysis, if any one test does not reach the ninety-five
percent level, several tests can be combined to achieve the greater than
ninety-five percent threshold, making the analysis valid. "5 Professor
Krotoszynski proposes performing the individual tests for state action,
and if none support a state action finding individually, their findings
6
should be combined to see if the ninety-five percent threshold is met.'
Thus, the totality/meta-analysis approach adheres to the conclusion in
Burton that state action determinations should be made on a case-by-case
basis,"I yet provides the flexibility to use any or all of the tests to establish
state action." 8 This approach, in addition to providing more flexibility,
allows the retention of each case's uniqueness, while still providing a
uniform test for state action.
II.

THE PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEM"9 AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UTILIZATION REVIEW SYSTEMS
A.

Background

The passage of workers' compensation laws across the nation provided
injured workers a form of redress outside of traditional tort remedies.'20
In Pennsylvania, workers' compensation is the sole remedy for workers
injured on the job," and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that
the Workers' Compensation Act "must be liberally construed to
effectuate its humanitarian objectives.,122

115. Id. (citing Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of
Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Benedictin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 683-85, 685 n.184 (1992)).
116. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 337. Professor Krotoszynski uses only
three tests, combining the nexus and joint participation tests in his analysis.
117. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
118. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 333. Krotoszynski likens the current
state action doctrine to a child's cobbler's bench. Much like the individual pieces
and holes in the bench, if the facts of a particular case (pieces) do not fit into one
of the available state action tests (holes), it will be discarded.
119. For an overview of workers' compensation law in Pennsylvania, see
DAVID

B.

TORREY

&

ANDREW

E. GREENBERG, PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS'
§§ 1:1-1:67 (LAWYERS COOPERATIVE 1995).

COMPENSATION: LAW AND PRACTICE,

120. Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. 40, 44 (1999).
121. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 481(a) (1992).
122. See Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 439 A.2d 627, 630 (1981).
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Pennsylvania enacted its Workers' Compensation Act in 1915.123 The
program is currently administered by the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation (BWC) within the Department of Labor and Industry
(L&I).2 " Under the Act, all employers who meet the statutory
requirements
must obtain workers' compensation insurance for their
•
125
employees. The Act gives employers the option to self-insure, purchase
126
insurance from the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (SWIF),
or
127
7
contract with a private insurer for coverage . Those who choose to selfinsure must apply to L&I to determine whether it is financially able to
provide for the necessary coverage. 28 If an employee is injured on the
job, the insurer or self-insuring employer must make all payments for
medical services 29 within thirty days of receipt of the bills and report this
information to the service provider.3
B.

Growing Problems Within the Workers' CompensationSystem
and the UtilizationReview Solution

As the sole remedy available for injured workers, the function, scope
and cost of the workers' compensation system have expanded,"' much to
the fiscal detriment of many Pennsylvania employers. In 1985, the
Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted a statewide
poll to determine the level of support for legislative reforms to the

123. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 77, §§ 1 (West 1992 and Supp. 1998).
The Act has been amended several times since then, most notably in 1993, 1993
Pa. Laws 190, and 1996, Act of June 24, P.L. 350, No. 57.
124. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 568 (West 1992 and Supp. 1998).
125. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 501(a)(1) (West 1992 and Supp. 1998).
126. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701 (1998). The State Workmen's Insurance Fund
(SWIF) is "the State-operated insurance carrier from which workmen's
compensation insurance policies may be purchased by employers to cover all risks
of liability under this act including those declined by private carriers." Id.
127. See TORREY, supra note 119.
128. See id.
129. The 1993 and 1996 changes implemented a utilization review system
which allows for an automatic suspension of the payment of benefits pending a
determination of the reasonableness and necessity of the individual charges. This
will be discussed in the following section involving utilization review.
130. See 34 PA. CODE § 127.208(a) (2000).
131. Prior to implementation of the utilization review program, an insurer
was unable to recoup payments made for treatments that were later found
unnecessary and unreasonable. Their only recourse was to retrieve funds for such
claims from the SWIF. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. 40, 45 n.2 (1999).
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workers' compensation system. 112 The survey found that seventy-five
percent of those surveyed (whose operations accounted for over 350,000
employees) rated workers' compensation reform as a high priority.'33 An
alarming thirty percent stated that workers' compensation costs had
affected, or may affect, their future expansion in the state.'

A 1993

report prepared by the Professional Insurance Agents Association also
found that Pennsylvania's workers' compensation
costs were noticeably
35
higher than those costs in neighboring states.
In response to the growing concerns of both business and labor
organizations, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 44 of
1993.13' The primary change in the new law was the implementation of a
voluntary utilization review program to provide flexibility for insurers in
an attempt to reduce the program's costs. 137 Under Act 44, L&I could
authorize the use of utilization review organizations (UROs) to determine
the reasonableness and necessity of certain treatments.
These UROs
were required to be composed of either an impartial physician, surgeon or
other health care provider, or a panel of such professionals and providers.
Once authorized by L&I, the composition of the UROs would be
published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. 3 9 The UROs would apply
generally accepted treatment protocols to each case reviewed 140 to
determine whether each disputed charge was necessary and reasonable. 141
The new program functions as follows:142 once an employee is injured
on the job and the insurer or self-insuring employer receives the bills for
132. Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Pennsylvania
Workers' Compensation Survey, 1985.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Insurance Agents Association of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware,

Inc., Workers' Compensation Rate Comparison for Pennsylvania and Bordering
States, (February 1993). Also, prior to Act 44, an insurer could not recover for
treatments which were later found to be unnecessary or unreasonable. Sullivan,
526 U.S. at 45 n.2.
136. Act of July 2, 1993, No. 44 (codified at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531 (West
1998)).
137. Id. § 306(f)(2)(ii).
138. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 29 (2000).

139. Id. The Pennsylvania Bulletin is the state equivalent of the Federal
Register.
140. 34 PA. CODE § 127.467 (2000).
141. 34 PA. CODE § 127.470.

142. For an excellent discussion of the beginning-to-end procedures created
by Act 44, see Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 163-65 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the incident, the insurer has the right to petition L&I for utilization
review (UR) to determine the reasonableness and necessity of any of the
charges. 4' The insurer requesting UR must then serve all interested
parties with a copy of the request.144 Before randomly assigning the
request to a licensed URO, L&I must review the one-page form to
determine its completeness 45 and
provide a notice of the URO
46
assignment to all parties involved.1
Once the request for UR is received, the thirty-day payment period is
tolled, allowing the insurer to suspend payment of benefits to the injured
worker pending the results of UR. 147 If any party is not satisfied by the
results of the UR, that party can file a petition for review with L&I, which
will then assign the request to a workers' compensation judge.14' That
judge can then consider the UR report, but is not bound by its findings. 9
The injured worker is notified at two stages: 1) when the insurer
requests review which usually suspends payment of benefits pending
utilization review; 50 and 2) when the request is forwarded (Notice of

143. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531(5). In addition, the party requesting UR is
required to pay the costs of the review. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531(6)(iii).
144. 34 PA. CODE § 127.452(b) (2000). Previously, the injured employee was
not notified that his benefits might be terminated.
145. 34 PA. CODE § 127.453(a).
146. Id. § 127.452(b).
147. The UR must be completed within 30 days. Under the regulations, the
insurer's right to suspend payment continues beyond the UR process until a final
determination is reached. 34 PA. CODE § 127.208. During the pendency of the
proceedings, a Claimant can continue to receive treatment, yet the doctor cannot
receive actual payment for the services by the employer until the UR process is
completed.
148. Under the old system (prior to Act 57 of 1996), if an employee failed to
win his review during reconsideration, the losing worker was required to pay for
the costs of reconsideration. As stated in the text, under the new system, the
reconsideration step is removed and the case goes before a workers' compensation
judge. See Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 at *2-3(E.D. Pa. 1996). If the WCJ
rules against the Claimant, the injured worker can appeal to the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board within L&I. If this appeal is also unsuccessful, the
Claimant can appeal to the state's Commonwealth Court, which has appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by any state agency.
149. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531.(6)(iv) (2000).
150. See Respondent's Brief, American Mfg. Mut. Ins., Co. v. Sullivan, 1998
WL 847509 at *10 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting the pre-Act 44 portion of the law which
stated that the petition for Department review would not act as an automatic
supersedeas, and would mandate that employers maintain payments during review
(formerly 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531)).
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Assignment) to a URO. At this stage, the employee may submit a
personal statement regarding his or her view of the necessity and
reasonableness of the treatment. 51
Under the law, an injured employee awaiting the results of the UR
process, even if able to pay, would not be allowed to personally pay for
the services.12 The employee is, in effect, a captive of the insurer and the
utilization review process. He or she is forced to await findings, and may
incur massive debt, while the treating physician tries to recover the
treatment costs that may not be covered by the employer.'53
1.
Lower Courts' Responses to Similar State-Authorized
Private Review Systems
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Sullivan, several lower courts
reviewed the state action implications of quasi-governmental health care
review systems and returned with mixed reactions. 1
In Grenz v.
EBI/Orion Group, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a
facial challenge to a provision of the Montana Workers' Compensation
Act that required that an injured worker be examined by a panel of
physicians to determine whether the recipient's benefits continued."' The
plaintiff in Grenz sued his insurance provider for invoking a medical
review panel to evaluate his benefits."' In finding that the state of
Montana did not participate in the review of the medical panel or the
subsequent response by the insurer, the Ninth Circuit held that no state
action existed for § 1983 purposes.
The Ninth Circuit focused on the
fact that the insurer, not the state, determines the membership of the
panel and that use of the panel was not mandatory. 158
151. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Notice of Assignment
of Utilization Review Request, Form LIBC-514 5-98. Prior to the Third Circuit's
decision, the employee was not allowed the opportunity to provide any input into
the UR process. Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
152. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531(5) (2000). Only employers and insurers can
pay for the treatments.
153. See Respondent's Brief at **7, American Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 WL
847509. If the treatments are ultimately found unreasonable and unnecessary, the
doctor is then forced to try to recover the costs from the state Supersedeas fund.
34 Pa. Code § 127.208(f) (2000).
154. For a general discussion on the state action implications of several new
public/private endeavors, see Barak-Erez, supra note 7.
155. 968 F.2d 1220, 1992 WL 158158 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished decision).
156. Id.
157. Id. at *1.

158. Id.
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In Fleming v. Workers' Compensation Commission," 9 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the validity of a
Virginia statute that allowed a private insurer to terminate benefits
without a hearing.1 6 The plaintiff in Fleming missed a work hardening
evaluation for fear of the pain involved, which led the privateS .insurer
to
161
invoke the Virginia rule and to terminate the plaintiff's benefits.
The
court, relying on Grenz, dismissed the § 1983 complaint, and ruled that
although the state extensively regulates the workers' compensation
process, the decision to terminate benefits is made solely by the private
insurer. 162
Furthermore, in Stanescu v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co.,163 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals used a similar approach when it affirmed
a federal court's ruling that a private insurer did not function as a state
actor by refusing to pay the medical costs of an injured worker.' 64 Despite
plaintiff's arguments that there was a degree of interdependence between
the private insurer and the state that rose to the level of a monopoly, the
court concluded that the private insurer's refusal to settle the plaintiff's
claim did not make the insurer a state actor.
Although these recent decisions failed to find state action when a
private insurer used state-authorized peer review bodies in workers'
compensation cases, 166 at least one court has
167 private insurers
• found that
can qualify as state actors under these circumstances.
In Catanzano v.

159. 878 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1995).
160. Id. at 855 n.1. Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission Rule
1.4(C)(2) allows termination of coverage if a recipient refuses a medical
examination. Id.
161. 878 F. Supp. at 855-56.
162. Id. at 860-61. The court here also focused on the fact that the state's
involvement was limited to the adjudication of the application's merits.
163. 101 F.3d 1393, 1996 WL 466648 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished decision).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id. at *1-2.
166. This is not to say that all workers' compensation cases involving ' 1983
complaints have failed to find state action. Most notable is Baksalary v. Smith,
579 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984), which formed the primary basis for the Third
Circuit's decision in Sullivan and was a major component in the Circuit split
resolved by the Supreme Court.
167. In Pennsylvania, courts have also failed to find state action in the actions
of a private service which designated resource hospitals as part of a larger
emergency medical service system program, see Community Med. Ctr. v.
Emergency Med. Serv. of Northeastern PA, 712 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1983), and peer
review organizations who evaluate medical claims under the Pennsylvania Motor
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Wing,' a plaintiff sued a Certified Home Health Agency (CHHA) when
her Medicaid benefits were reduced below her doctor's recommendations
by a quasi-governmental health care entity. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found state action based on a New York
Statute that provided for private determinations of the appropriateness
•• . . 169
and medical necessity of home health services covered by Medicaid.
Further, the court also found that the services provided by the CHHA
were part of an interdependent system designed to carry out the state's
Medicaid program. 17 The court stated that "the CHHAs [were] not
independent actors doing business with the state, but are entities that
have assumed the responsibility for the State's mandated health care
,
duties. 171
The Catanzano Court's ruling placed some emphasis on the nature of
the service provided and whether the service was traditionally provided
by the state. This same emphasis was used in a Pennsylvania case from
the 1980s, Baksalary v. Smith.17 This case led to a subsequent split
between the Third and Fifth Circuits on the state actor issue and forced
the United States Supreme Court to determine the scope and role of
state-authorized peer review organizations involved in workers'
compensation programs.
Baksalary'73 and Barnes 74-The Courts Divide on the Role
2.
of Peer Benefits Review in Workers' Compensation Programs
The primary issue faced by the court in Baksalary was whether a
private insurer's suspension of an injured employee's workers'
compensation benefits pending a state-authorized review procedure
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 175 In Baksalary, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a preAct 44 version of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act violated

Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1797(b) (2000); see
also Mirabile v. State Farm Insurance Co., No. Civ. A. 94-0194, 1994 WL 702612
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1994).
168. 103 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1996).
169. Id. at 226. The statute at issue was §§ 3602(3) and 3614(1) of New
York's Public Health Law. N.Y. Pub Health Law §§ 3602(3), 3614(1) (1987).
170. Catanzano, 103 F.3d at 227.
171. Id.
172. 579 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
173. Id.
174. Barnes v. Lehman, 861 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1988).
175. See Baksalary, 579 F. Supp. at 218.
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the plaintiff's due process rights. 17 6 Under review in Baksalary was the
supersedeas provision included in § 413 of the Act that permitted insurers
and employers to petition for review of workers' benefits, effectively
terminating benefits pending the referee's review. 117 The complex class
action suit 17 questioned the process where an insurer or employer without
notice or opportunity to be heard by the injured worker would file a
petition for review and receive a completeness review from the state,
which then would forward the petition to a worker's compensation
referee, effectively suspending
the injured worker's benefits during the
179
review.
the
of
pendency
Following the analysis used in Lugar, the court found that the worker's
continued receipt of workers' compensation benefits constituted a
property right that was violated by the employers and insurers who were
imbued with the authority of the state.8 In applying the first part of the
Lugar analysis, that is, whether a protected property interest existed, the
court concluded that the potential for an injured worker to be without
benefits for several months constituted the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected property interest.8 The court, utilizing the
"close nexus" approach, held that since "the deprivation requires a special
2
filing process specifically created by the state," there was state action. 8
This conclusion recognized that the private use of the supersedeas
provision, which required state approval
of the petition, constituted joint
18 3
participation and thus, state action.
The Fifth Circuit faced a similar benefit termination procedure in

176. Id. at 219.
177. Id. A supersedeas is "A writ or bond that suspends a judgment
creditor's power to levy execution, usu[ally] pending appeal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1452 (7th ed. 1998). In this case, the supersedeas is the termination
of the injured worker's receipt of workers' compensation benefits pending
utilization review. Supersedeas is also an emergency remedy available to
employers who object to the questionable payment of benefits.
178. The actual discovery for this case lasted for five years. Bakslary, 579 F.
Supp. at 220.
179. Id. at 221-22.
180. Id. at 228.
181. Id. at 224-25. The District Court found no difference between the
workers' compensation benefits at stake in the present case with the state
disability benefits upheld in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), discussed
infra at footnote 201.
182. Baksalary, 579 F. Supp at 228.
183. Id. at 231-32.
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Barnes v. Lehman,' 4 yet failed to find state action in light of the Baksalary
decision. At issue was a section of the Texas Workers' Compensation
Law that allowed an insurer to terminate workers' compensation benefits
based on the review of a private physician.'85 In Barnes, an injured worker
brought a § 1983 action against the reviewing doctor and the insurer for
the same reasons as the plaintiff in Baksalary; however, unlike the
previous case, the injured Texas worker was left without a remedy.18' The
court, relying on Blum rather than Lugar, refused to adopt the "joint
participation" approach, emphasizing that the doctor's and insurer's
actions were purely private actions, not those of the state. 87 The court
found that "[T]exas, like most other states, endorses a compensation
system as a matter of policy. Approval of the system, however, does not
automatically' 8burden the state with responsibility for every instance of its

application." "

outcomes from similar private party based review
The •*divergent
189
provided the impetus for the Supreme Court to grant
provisions
certiorari.
III.

THE SULLIVAN DECISION

A.

1 90
District Court Dismissal

In Slliana
goup

f ijurd

.

191

workers'
along with • two
In Sullivan,
•
193
•
.192a group of injured workers,
organizations, brought a class action suit against state officials, several

184. 861 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1988).
185. Id. at 1384.
186. Id. at 1386.
187. Id. at 1387.
188. Id. at 1388.
189. The actual clash was between Barnes and the Third Circuit's decision in
Sullivan v. Barnett,which based much of its reasoning on Baksalary.
190. Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
191. The named plaintiffs were Delores Scott Sullivan, William Battle, Louis
Baumgartner, Anthony Cancila, Christopher Costello, William Dillon, Terrance
Ervine, Lisa Lex, Charles Matthews, and Susan Hansen. Complaint at J1% 5-14.
192. The Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health and
the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO. Complaint at $91 1415.
193. Johnny Butler, Secretary of Labor and Industry; Richard Himler,
Executive Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation; Insurance
Commissioner Constance Foster; State Treasurer, Catherine Baker Knoll; and
SWIF director, John O'Malley. Complaint at $ 18-27.
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insurers 94 and the School District of Philadelphia, alleging a violation of
the plaintiff class' due process rights under § 1983.'95 Prior to argument
before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the claims against the private insurers, who had previously
requested utilization
review, were dismissed as the court held that no state
•
196
action existed.
After the injured workers and labor organizations were
certified as a class,' 9' the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming that due process did not prohibit the supersedeas pending UR
and that the procedures in place provided adequate due process
protections.9
The district court set forth a three-part test to determine if the
challenged provisions caused a deprivation of due process: 1) was there a
deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest?; 2)
did the method deprive the claimant of due process?; and 3) did a state
actor cause the deprivation?199
Relying on Baksalary, the court found that the injured workers were
deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. 200 Yet, using
the Matthews factors,201 the court failed to find a due process violation,
194. American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co., CIGNA Corp., Commercial Union
Insurance, Continental Casualty Insurance, Donegal Mutual Insurance, Hartford
Mutual Insurance, USF&G Insurance, and Zurich American Insurance.
Complaint at
23-30.
195. The six-count complaint alleged that: 1) the automatic supersedeas
provision in § 306(f)(1) violated plaintiffs' right to procedural due process; 2) the
same sections failed to provide the plaintiffs with an opportunity to be heard; 3)
the assessment of the reconsideration fee without notice or opportunity to be
heard by the injured worker violated the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights;
4) the reconsideration fee violated plaintiffs' substantive due process rights; 5) the
lack of governing regulations regarding review of the URO process violated
procedural due process; and 6) the deprivation of medical benefits deprived the
injured plaintiffs of liberty without due process of law. Complaint at $$ 265-82.
196. Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 at *9. The memorandum decision
was handed down on January 24, 1996. Sullivan v. Barnett, 913 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.
Pa. 1996), rev'd 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
197. On May 28, 1996, the plaintiffs moved for class certification for all
workers who have had or will have the payment of their medical benefits affected.
Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d at 166. See also Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. at 47 n.6.

198. Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 at *4.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *5.
201. In Mathews, the Supreme Court established a test to determine whether
a benefit termination system complies with due process. Specifically, courts were
to review the following criteria to determine whether there was a Fourteenth
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ruling that: 1) the fact that injured workers may have alternative forms of
income and that other remedies were available under the system "lessens
the potential harm" to a worker's interest in his or her uninterrupted
receipt of workers' compensation benefits;

20 2

2) the UR system employed

several other safeguards that reinforced the objectivity of the medical
analysis to protect against an erroneous deprivation;2 0 3 and 3) it was clear
that the UR program was created in response to the government's interest
treatment. 2 4
in controlling the high costs of insurance and medical
Finding that the UR program adequately addressed the Mathews
205
• •due
issue
action
state
the
address
to
not
decided
court
the
process concerns,
206
and granted the government defendants' motion to dismiss.
B.

Third CircuitReversal2 '

On review, the Third Circuit began its analysis of the dismissal by
reinforcing the confusion brought about by the inconsistent application of
The opinion established that since the
the state action doctrine.
Commonwealth created the entitlement of workers' compensation,
a
continued receipt of these benefits transformed the
209
.... system into
plaintiffs.
the
injured
constitutionally-protected property interest for
Next, the court addressed the state actor issue, focusing on the unique

Amendment violation: 1) the private interest involved; 2) the risk that the
procedures would result in an erroneous deprivation of the interest; and 3) the
governmental interests involved, including administrative burdens and available
alternatives. 424 U.S. at 335.
202. Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 at *5-6. The court mentioned two
specific remedies still available to the injured worker, namely that: 1) an injured
worker is entitled to his/her award plus interest if they are successful in a URO
appeal; and 2) the injured worker may also recover litigation costs. Id. at *6.
203. Id. at *6-8. Specifically, the court focused on: 1) the fact that the URO's
decision had to be based on a medical determination; 2) the URO's decision had
to be based only on the physician's records and testimony; and 3) many of the
notice problems involved in Baksalary had been remedied under the Act 44
system. Id.
204. Id. at *8.
205. Id. at *9.
206. Sullivan v. Butler, 1996 WL 654032 at *12. The court also failed to find a
due process violation in the imposition of reconsideration fees or the lack of
regulations promulgated for the program.
207. Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1998).
208. Id. at 167.
209. Id. at 168. Both parties stipulated to this fact.
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"self-contained" nature of the utilization review system.2 Interestingly,
the court approached the issue from three different perspectives. First,
the court recognized that, traditionally, only the state had the power to
invoke supersedeas procedures and that, under the new system, the
private insurer possessed the ability to utilize this traditional public
function."' Second, the court suggested a possible nexus relationship
between the insurers and the state, noting that the supersedeas
procedures were not self-executing and that the insurer could not move
forward without the state's approval." Finally, the court employed a
joint participation approach and found that the mandatory state program
"inextricably entangles the insurance companies in a partnership with the
Commonwealth such that they become
an integral part of the state in
213
scheme.,
statutory
the
administering
The court reiterated the importance of doing a fact-specific analysis in
state action determinations, criticizing the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Barnes v. Lehman by outlining several significant differences between the
214
Texas and Pennsylvania systems. After finding that state action existed,
the Third Circuit criticized the analysis of the district court, finding that
the supersedeas procedures in question survived the Mathews test." The
court ruled that the current utilization review procedures violated due
process, 216
and mandated the defendants make several changes to the
program. Specifically, the court mandated that injured employees
be given: 1) timely and reasonable notice of the imminent
suspension of the medical benefits and treatment before the
suspension takes effect; 2) a description of the reasons why
utilization review has been invoked; 3) an opportunity and time
to submit a personal statement in writing regarding the
employee's view of the reasonableness and/or necessity of the
disputed medical treatments; and 4) a description of the
procedures under which the employee can appeal an adverse

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.

213. Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d at 170.
214. Id. The court found several differences between the Texas and

Pennsylvania schemes, specifically that: 1) the provisions permitting termination
were not the same; 2) it was unclear whether the Texas program was an opt-in
program; and 3) under the Texas program, it was unclear whether state
involvement was necessary prior to termination.
215. Id. at 171-76.
216. Id. at 176.
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determination.1 7
After the Third Circuit's reversal, L&I changed the regulations to
incorporate the court's mandates, providing more opportunities for input
and notice. 2" Although the new regulations appeared more generous to
injured workers, the fundamental issues of whether the system
transformed private insurers into state actors and whether this violated
due process still remained in dispute.

C.
1.

The Supreme Court's Analysis

21

State Action Analysis

Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion by outlining the proper
analysis for review of a facial challenge to the Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation Act. Specifically, the Court employed the two-part Lugar
test which sought to determine: 1) whether the deprivation was caused by
a state-created right or privilege, under a state-imposed rule, or carried
out by someone for whom the state assumed responsibility, and 2)
whether the defendants could fairly be said to be state actors. 22 The
Court found a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right; however,
221
it failed to find state action by the private insurer.
The Court approached the "fairly attributable" part of the Lugar
analysis from several angles. First, the Court, citing Jackson and Blum,
ruled that no sufficiently close nexus existed to constitute state action by
the private insurers."' Further, the decision to invoke utilization review
claims
was not made by the state, but by the
of workers' compensation
--.
223
The opinion then recognized that, standing
private insurers themselves.
alone, the Court has never held that the private use of a state-created

217. Id. at 178.
218. American Manufacturers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 46 n.3
(1999). Justice Stevens' concurrence also approves of the Third Circuit's changes
to the previously deficient regulations mandating that: 1) injured workers be
notified that the request for utilization review could result in the suspension of
their benefits; and 2) the same workers would be allowed the opportunity to
present a personal statement. Id. at 64.
219. Id. at 40.
220. Id. at 50.
221. Id. Here, the Court recognized that even though the UR was not "self
executing," the Respondents still had to prove the other part of the Lugar test. Id.
at 50 n.9.
222. Id. at 52.
223. Id.
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remedy could establish state action. 224 The Court distinguished the
challenged UR system as more akin to "state inaction" and possibly even
"a legislative decision not to intervene in a dispute between an insurer
and an employee over whether a particular treatment is reasonable and
necessary.'225
Strangely, the Court found that while the URO itself functioned as a
state actor, a private insurer's use of this legislatively-created mechanism
did not provide enough evidence to conclude that the state encouraged
the action. 26 In direct conflict with the ruling in Baksalary, the Court
found that "nothing in Pennsylvania's constitution or statutory scheme
obligates the State to provide either medical treatment or workers'
compensation benefits to injured workers. 227 Expanding on this analysis,
the Court held that the creation of the SWIF, to guarantee benefits in the
event that an insurer becomes insolvent, did not suggest that the state
imposed on itself the obligation to provide benefits to injured workers. 221
The Court concluded its state action analysis by incorporating the
public function approach used in Jackson and Blum." 9 First, the majority
held that because the state has recognized, restricted and restored the
private insurer's right to withhold benefits, this legislative involvement did
not act as a delegation of a traditional exclusive public function. 230 Chief
Justice Rehnquist further stated that heavy state regulation of the UR
practice, by itself, did not alter the fact that decisions to invoke utilization
review were made by private insurers.23 After applying this rationale to
the facts of the instant case, the Court failed to find state action in the
private insurer's actions."'
2.

ProtectedPropertyInterestAnalysis

Even though the respondent's claim was terminated by a finding of "no
state action," the Court nonetheless decided to address the protected

224. Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. at 53.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 54.
227. Id. at 55-56.
228. Id. at 56 n.11.
229. Id. at 57.
230. Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. at 58.
231. Id.
232. The Court was concerned that the Third Circuit had "fundamentally
misunderstood" the workers' property interest and believed that if the issue was
not readily addressed, it could have drastic ramifications for the state, the private
insurers, and the SWIF. Id. at 58.
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interest analysis.2 33 The court applied a two-step due process test, seeking
to determine: (1) whether a property or liberty interest had been deprived
and (2) whether
the state's procedures protected the claimaint's due
234
process rights.
On the property interest issue, the Court found that the termination of
workers' compensation benefits was a fundamentally different interest
235
from those evident in Goldberg v. Kelly.
In the present case,
Pennsylvania law did not entitle employees to payment of all medical
treatment, but rather to payment of those charges deemed "reasonable
and necessary" after utilization review. 236 In order for the property
interest in workers' compensation benefits to rise to the same level as the
welfare benefits in Goldberg, the Court ruled that the employee must
establish employer liability, in addition to the reasonableness and
necessity of the treatment. 37 Because the Respondent failed to show that
a property interest existed, namely, that the treatments were reasonable
and necessary, the Court did not reach the Mathews process analysis when
it reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit.238
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence expressed concerns about the Court's
decision to conduct the property interest analysis after it had found no
state action. Although she recognized that the workers' compensation
program required fair procedures to adjudicate the injured workers'
claims, she cautioned the Court to exercise judicial restraint, absent a
necessity to reach the remainder of the analysis.23 9 Justices Breyer and
Souter joined in a separate concurrence, taking issue with the Court's
property interest analysis. 241 Specifically, Justices Breyer and Souter
expressed their belief that there may be certain factual circumstances
where the receipt of continued medical benefits might create a property
interest.241

233. Id. at 59.
234. Id. at 60. Goldberg established that a welfare recipient's right to
continued receipt of welfare benefits constituted a protected property interest.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-66 (1970).
235. Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. at 60-61.
236. Id. The Court believed that the respondent class had failed "to make
good on their claim that the particular medical treatment they received was
reasonable and necessary." Id.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Sullivan v. Barnett, 526 U.S. at 63.
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Justice Stevens' dissent also focused on the property interest argument,
concluding that the review procedures must be fair because the UROs are
state actors. 242
He stated that the original procedures were
constitutionally deficient, but expressed no disagreement with the
amended procedures subsequent to the Third Circuit's ruling. 243 His two
primary concerns were: 1) the focus should have been placed on the
UROs, not the insurers, in determining the fairness of the procedures, and
2) the majority failed to discern whether the procedures were fair prior to
244
or after the Third Circuit's ruling.
The Court's reversal in Sullivan was based on the use of a disjointed
state action analysis that led to an incorrect and unfair result. The Court
looked at an individual state action test and discarded its entire value
when all the elements of the test were not satisfied. The better course of
action is to combine the state action indicators from each of the four tests
to make a "totality of the circumstances" determination.
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence outlined the second major flaw with the
245
decision.
Once the Supreme Court failed to find state action, it did not
have to reach the second part of the § 1983 inquiry, specifically, whether
the termination of workers' compensation benefits constituted a protected
property interest and what process inquiry was to be used to determine
that issue. The Court's holding goes against the findings of the district
court, the Third Circuit, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, three
tribunals which properly found a protected property interest. In fact, the
potential damage from the Court's ruling could seriously inhibit the
development of innovative workers' compensation review mechanisms on
the state level.
Further, the Sullivan decision has serious ramifications for workers'
compensation systems, utilization review programs, and injured workers
nationwide.
After the Third Circuit decision, the Pennsylvania
Department of Labor and Industry incorporated changes mandated by
the court in its utilization review program. After Sullivan, what is the
status of those changes? Will the Department of Labor and Industry, or
the Pennsylvania General Assembly make any changes to remedy or
prevent some of the backlash that may occur in the workers'
compensation program? The Sullivan decision seems to have created
more questions than it answered.

242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 62.
See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 337.
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IV. SULLIVAN UNDER THE META-ANALYSIS MICROSCOPE.

Since the Supreme Court failed to find state action after applying
several different state actor tests in isolation, substantive application of
Professor Krotoszynski's "meta-analysis" approach to the private
insurers' use of utilization review could effectively transform the insurers
into state actors and establish a due process violation. The meta-analysis
approach is simple.246 If the findings of any one of the four state action
tests, by themselves, do not establish a ninety-five percent state action
confidence rating, the findings of all four tests should be applied and the
successful elements of
each combined to see if the ninety-five percent
247
threshold can be met.
In applying Professor Krotoszynski's meta-analytical approach to this
legal quagmire, difficulties abound, i.e., how to quantify the findings of
each analysis. The factors used in this analysis were drawn from a survey
of the important Supreme Court cases utilizing the four State Action tests
and factor values were assigned as follows:
1 = Factor strongly suggests state action
.5 = Factor mildly supports state action
0 = Factor provides no support for state action.
Although it is difficult to assign a quantitative value to any test or factor
in such an analysis, this Note's purpose is to show the need for a synergy
between the findings of the four tests that will produce a more balanced
conclusion.
A.

Public FunctionAnalysis

Although the exclusive public function test has been narrowly
interpreted in recent years, 248 factors gained from previous applications of
this test will be of value in a state action meta-analysis to Sullivan. Piecing
together the fifty-plus years of "exclusive public function" caselaw,
several questions/issues have emerged under which the Sullivan facts can
be reviewed, namely:

246. Id.

Krotoszynski's article applies meta-analysis to three tests, the

exclusive government function test; the nexus test; and the symbiotic relationship
test. Id. at 324-25. Based on other sources, another approach identifies the joint
participation test, which is included in the meta-analysis of Sullivan. See generally,
Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 7, at 520.

247. See supra Section I.A.
248. Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). As mentioned
earlier, this is a very amorphous list and an even more puzzling determination.
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whether the activity is a public function24 9
whether the activity is delegated by the state to the private
actor 250
* whether the activity is one which is under the exclusive
251
prerogative of the state
252
* how the private entity functions within the system
Applying this issue framework to Sullivan, answers to two of the
questions point strongly toward state action, one slightly for, and one
against. The Third Circuit established that the ability to invoke a
supersedeas was traditionally the function of the state, 253 and through Act
44, the state delegated the power to invoke the suspension to the private
parties. Next, the review and termination of benefits is not traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the state, but the termination cannot go
forward without L&I determining whether the UR request is complete. 254
Last, the private insurer's role in the system does not point directly
toward state action because the private insurer is merely given the
255
opportunity to request utilization review.
Because the public function doctrine has been narrowly interpreted by
256
the current Court, there is no state action using the test in isolation, but
two of its factors strongly suggest state action and one factor mildly
supports state action. These two and a half out of four favorable state
action factors will be combined with the findings of similar reviews for the
other three tests.
(Favorable %: 2.5 (1 + 1 + .5) out of 4 = 63% favorable rating)
*
*

249. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). It is important to note that in
Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, the Supreme Court refused to express their view as to
what exact scope of delegation would bring a private delegee under the regulation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 436 U.S. at 163-64.
250. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
251. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1988).
252. Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court
heavily relied on Jackson in the Sullivan decision, but a closer review of Jackson
showed that the specific "public function" at issue (the provision of public utility
service) was specifically rejected as not being a public function by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in GirardLife Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia,88 Pa.

393 (1879).. No such ruling on a benefit termination was present in Sullivan.
253. See generally Strickland, supra note 7.
254. 34 PA. CODE § 127.208 (2000).
255. See generally, Strickland, supra note 7.
256. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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B.

Symbiotic Relationship Analysis

Perhaps the most confusing (or unstructured) analysis involved in state
action determinations is the symbiotic relationship test, which has been
used successfully only once. Since its decision in Burton,"' the Supreme
Court has never found state action based solely on this theory. By parsing
some of the cases that apply this test, several characteristics might
establish the degree of interdependence found sufficient in Burton. Such
factors include:
* mutually-conferred benefits...
* a close fiscal relationship...
* a lessor/lessee relationship."6
Applied to this case, the only factor that points toward state action is the
mutually-conferred benefit. Specifically, the fact that the state created the
utilization review mechanism to alleviate burdensome costs, while
outsourcing certain review functions previously provided by the public
sector, points toward state action. This factor will only provide one
favorable state action factor out of three and will be of marginal weight as
a part of the overall state action meta-analysis of Sullivan.
(Favorable %: 1 of 3 = 33% favorable rating)
C.

Close Nexus Analysis

Closely tied to the symbiotic relationship test is the close nexus test,
where a private party can be deemed a state actor if a sufficiently close
nexus exists between the two entities after a detailed inquiry. 261 Some
questions which may be asked in this determination are:
6
* Is there extensive state regulation? 1
263
* Is there monopoly status?
* Is the state
specifically responsible for the contested
264
conduct?

*

265
Is the party a government contractor?

257. Id. at 724.
258. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).
259. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
260. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 350.
See id. at 358.
See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982).
Tulsa Prof'l Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487 (1988).
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*

Is the state necessary in order to activate or allow the activity
in question to commence? 266

*

Is there evidence
of pervasive and substantial involvement by
267
the state?
• Does the state-created framework governing the 26conduct
8
provide the private actor with a "mantle of authority?,
Unlike the first two tests, several factors in the nexus analysis point
toward state action in Sullivan. Two strongly suggest state action, two
hint at it, and three do not support state action at all. First, the state is
specifically responsible for the program, the General Assembly created it.
Most importantly, the insurer cannot move forward without the
authorization of the state. The state's role is to determine the
completeness of the UR request.
Although the state's action is
characterized as solely administrative, the fact remains that the process
cannot go forward without L&I's approval. Those factors that mildly
suggest state action are the extensive regulation of workers' compensation
systems by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the state's pervasive
and substantial involvement in the operation of the system. 269
Finally, there is no evidence of a state monopoly. The URO, not the
insurer, acts like an independent contractor, and it would be difficult to
show that the private insurer acts under a mantle of authority.
Nevertheless, many of the close nexus factors are illustrated in Sullivan
and will augment the confidence rating established by the two prior tests.
(Favorable %: 3(1 + 1 + .5 + .5) of 7 = 43% favorable rating)
D.

Joint ParticipationAnalysis

The final test is probably the most flexible and easiest to apply. The
joint participation test seeks to ascertain whether the state has mandated,
coerced or encouraged the alleged wrongful conduct. Some of the factors
that need to be considered are:
" Is the private party a willful
participant in a joint activity with
7
the state or its agents? 0
*

Is there a state official
engaged in a conspirational sense in the
271
forbidden activity?

266. Id.

267. N.C.A.A. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
268. See supra Part II.
269. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
270. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
271. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
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*
*
*
*
*

Can the state be seen as a joint venturer in the activity?.
Has the state
encouraged or exercised coercive power over the
27 3
activity?
Do state officials overtly
assist in the private use of state24
created procedures? 1
5
Is there significant state assistance?2
Did the state create the statutory scheme that led to the
forbidden private conduct?...
277
Is the private actor the state's agent?

*
Once again, the facts of Sullivan do not satisfy enough of the factors of
this particular approach to establish state action; a significant amount are
present to make a difference in the cumulative state-action confidence
rating. Factors strongly indicating state action are: 1) the state was a
willful participant in the scheme it created; 2) the state-created scheme
shows that the state overtly encouraged and assisted private participation;
and 3) the UR process cannot move forward without state monitoring and
assistance at several stages in the process. Although, the private insurer is
not an agent or joint venturer of the state, or involved in a conspiracy with
state officials, there is enough state involvement to attribute state actor
status to private insurers participating in the utilization review which
ultimately leads to the supersedeas.
(Favorable %: 5 (1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + .5 + .5) of 8 = 63% favorable
rating)
E.

Combining the Four Tests

When combined, the favorable ratings for the four tests are as follows:
Public Function = 63%
Symbiotic Relationship= 33%
Close Nexus= 43%
Joint Participation=63%
TOTAL= 202%
Although a 202% favorable rating is difficult to comprehend, it is entirely

272. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
273. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 933 (1982).
274. Id. at 937. See also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478, 487 (1988).
275. N.C.A.A. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
276. Id. at 193.
277. Krotoszysnki, supra note 7, at 324.
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conceivable that a similar analysis could generate the ninety-five percent
confidence rating needed to establish state action. In this case, two of the
four tests had a confidence rating of over fifty percent, with nexus
carrying several important factors and the remaining symbiosis test being
the test least frequently used by the Court.
Although a precise quantification of the value of each factor would
have to be done on a case-by-case basis, this basic analysis shows that the
mechanical application of discrete tests is both ineffective278 and allows for
too much uncertainty in state action decision-making. This uncertainty
could be alleviated easily through a similar, yet more detailed metaanalysis of each state action case. As the previous section shows, each of
the four tests had some hints of state action when applied to Sullivan, but
more importantly, when combined, there was enough state action
confidence to reach the ninety-five percent threshold advocated in
Krotoszynski's article.
Under the Court's present approach, it can pick and choose the
individual state action test(s), apply it (them) to the current set of facts,
and completely discard... any value the test may have on the decision if
the case does not "pass." It is important to recognize that the muchneeded synergy between the four approaches have their own, somewhat
distinguishable requirements. When brought together, the findings of the
four tests make much more sense out of the confusing statutory and
regulatory scheme seen in Sullivan than do each of the individual
approaches on their own.
CONCLUSION
• 280

State action continues to be a thorny subject, with the Supreme
Court's decision in Sullivan failing to make the doctrine any clearer. The
Court failed to see the bigger picture. Instead, it employed a narrow,
parochial approach to the state action doctrine and reached a very
unsettling conclusion. Its decision reinforces the need for the Court to
look for a new, more predictable approach to these difficult problems.
In examining Sullivan and the development of the state action doctrine
in Supreme Court caselaw, this Note reaches five conclusions, only one of
which is positive. These conclusions are: 1) the entire system is confusing
and ineffective; 2) there are several models which the Court can use
(depending on the source, three or four options are available) and each
278. Id. at 333.
279. See generally, Krotoszysnki, supra note 7.
280. Id.
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model seems to assume its own prongs of each test; 3) there is a fair
amount of overlap between the tests, with some tests being nearly
identical; 4) there does not seem to be any synergy between the tests and
5) the Court continues to adhere to the admonition in Burton that all state
action determinations need to be made in a case-by-case manner. (I think
a sixth conclusion is that NONE of the cases fits neatly into any one of
these tests!)
The use of meta-analysis can fix many, if not all of these flaws in the
Court's decision-making. First, the approach would allow each test to be
used and evaluated on its merits, and those findings retained to be
compiled with the results of other tests. Thus, each separate (or not-soseparate, as the case may be) test can build upon each other, developing
synergy and creating a better understanding of the larger state action
Second, the Court could continue to make state action
issue.
determinations on a case-by-case basis. Most importantly, meta-analysis
could make the system less confusing by allowing a court to incorporate
and adhere to the decisions of the past while utilizing several analytical
options in a synergistic, not isolated manner. This approach could
produce a less confusing and hopefully, more predictable analytical
construct for state action determinations in the future.
This entire analysis has focused on the confusion that is characteristic
of the Court's state action jurisprudence. After Sullivan, neither the
doctrine, nor the future role of utilization review in the workers'
compensation system, is any clearer.

